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1. Introduction  
 
 
  Foreword 
 
 
The idea to create an international criminal court appeared after the Second World 
War and only fifty years later such a court came into being. The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court entered into force after attracting the necessary 60 
ratifications in July 2002. As of 15 July 2008, the number of ratifications has risen to 107.1 
The International Criminal Court has started its work and it is the first permanent 
international judicial body that will bring to trial perpetrators of international crimes such 
as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression.  For the 
sake of effectiveness of the Court, it is important that ratification efforts continue until the 
Rome Statute gets universal acceptance. This will ensure the ICC the broadest jurisdiction.  
Acceptance of the Rome Statute poses a number of problems under domestic law; 
particularly ratification of this document raises issues of constitutional compatibility. 
Various issues have been raised in various countries (though some prove to be common to 
every state). However most states decided that their constitutions are in compliance with 
the Statute and ratified it. And only few states decided to amend constitutions.  
Ukraine is one of the states that is yet to become party to the Court, and the first step 
was taken on 20 January 2000, when Ukraine signed the Rome Statute. The main problem 
that Ukraine encountered on the way towards ratification was compatibility of the Rome 
Statute with the Ukrainian Constitution. Ukraine found it necessary to amend the 
Constitution in order to overcome the incompatibility.  
The aim of the thesis is to examine critically the constitutional issues that have been 
raised during the ratification of the Rome Statute by Ukraine. In this connection it will be 
discussed the opinion of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine on the conformity of the 
Rome Statute with the Constitution of Ukraine, and its way in managing the constitutional 
problems in light of international practice and opinions of both international and national 
scholars.  
The thesis focuses on four main issues that questioned the Rome Statute’s 
constitutionality in Ukraine: the principle of complementarity, the irrelevance of official 
capacity, surrender of Ukrainian citizens to the Court and the enforcement of sentences of 
                                                 
1 See Rome Statute Ratification Chart by Region (July 15, 2008), available at 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/RatificationsbyUNGroup_18_July_07.pdf  
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imprisonment in third states. It will be analyzed the nature of every specific problem, 
applying to provisions of the Statute and provisions of the Constitution of Ukraine.  
The thesis consists of five chapters. The first chapter of the thesis deals with general 
questions of ratification of the Rome Statute in Ukraine. A brief overview of the Ukrainian 
ratification process of international treaties will be given. Then the issues that raised 
concern about inconsistency of the Rome Statute with the Constitution of Ukraine will be 
examined. The second part of the first chapter touches upon the principle of 
complementarity of the ICC, which was declared inconsistent with the Constitution.  The 
opinion of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine on this issue will be discussed in light of 
experience of other states and opinions of Ukrainian and international commentators.  
Chapter two is focused on absence of immunity for Ukrainian officials under the 
Rome Statute. Examining both article 27 of the Rome Statute and experience of other 
states, the rule of irrelevance of official capacity before the ICC will be discussed, and 
whether it is compatible with constitutional provisions granting immunity to the President 
of Ukraine and People’s Deputies (Members of the Parliament). 
Chapter three examines the issue of surrender of Ukrainian nationals to the ICC. The 
main question that will be discussed here is whether there is an inconsistency between the 
duty to surrender suspects to the International Criminal Court and constitutional ban on 
extradition and expulsion of Ukrainian nationals.  
Chapter four deals with the question whether Ukrainian nationals serving sentences 
in another state may enjoy limited human rights guarantees in violation of the Constitution. 
The opinion of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine will be discussed in conjunction with 
provisions of articles 103 - 106 of the Statute and principle of complementarity. 
Chapter five is conclusion of the thesis. The issues that were not discussed by the 
Constitutional Court of Ukraine, but which may raise conflict between the Statute and the 
Constitution in the future will be examined. 
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1.2  Movement towards ratification: the Ukrainian perspective 
 
1.2.1 Ratification procedure for international treaties under the Ukrainian legislation 
 
 
According to the Constitution of Ukraine consent to the binding character of 
international treaties is granted by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine2 - the Parliament, sole 
body of legislative power in Ukraine.3  
There is no obligation under the national legislation of Ukraine to ratify an 
international treaty, which has been previously signed, but a treaty that requires 
ratification, is generally signed by Ukraine with the intention of ratifying it.4 
According to article 9 (1) of the Constitution, international treaties that are in force, 
ratified by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, become part of domestic law of Ukraine. 
Article 9 (2) provides that the conclusion of international treaties that contravene the 
Constitution of Ukraine is possible only after introducing relevant amendments to the 
Constitution of Ukraine. Hence the Constitution of Ukraine is the supreme law of the 
country and therefore international treaties have no supremacy over it. 
While Constitution provides general framework for the ratification procedures, the 
Law on International Agreements of Ukraine sets the procedure in details. The Law 
provides that international agreements of Ukraine shall be ratified following the adoption 
of the relevant law on ratification and the text of international agreement is a part thereof. 
On the basis of law, signed and officially published by the President of Ukraine, the 
Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine shall sign the instrument of ratification, which 
shall be certified by the signature of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, if the 
agreement provides for exchange of instruments of ratification.5  
The Constitutional Court of Ukraine makes conclusions on conformity of 
international agreements being considered by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine against the 
text of the Constitution of Ukraine.6 There is no requirement to seek conclusion of the 
Constitutional Court prior to ratification of a treaty. The Court provides such conclusions 
                                                 
2 Konstytuciya Ukrainy [Constitution of Ukraine] art.85.1 (32), the official translation is available at the web 
site of Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, at http://www.rada.gov.ua/const/conengl.htm [hereinafter Constitution of 
Ukraine]  
3 Id., art.75 
4 Council of Europe, Treaty Making – Expression  of Consent by States to be Bound by a Treaty (2001), 285 
(this part of the report is specifically devoted to the treaty-making process in Ukraine) 
5 Zakon Ukrainy pro Mizhnarodni Dogovory Ukrainy (2004) [Law on International Agreements of Ukraine] 
art.9, available at http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=1906-15  (English translation is my 
own) 
6 Constitution of Ukraine art.151  
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only on the appeal of the President of Ukraine or the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine 
(article 151 of the Constitution). Decisions and conclusions of the Constitutional Court of 
Ukraine are final and are not subject to appeal.7 
As it was mentioned above, in case when international treaties contravene the 
Constitution, ratification of such treaties is possible only if relevant amendments to the 
Constitution are introduced. Article 155 of the Constitution provides that a draft law on 
introducing amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine, previously approved by the 
majority of the constitutional composition of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, is deemed to 
be adopted if at the next regular session of the Parliament of Ukraine no less than two-
thirds of the constitutional composition of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine have voted in 
favour thereof.  
One more important issue that should be mentioned is correlation between 
international treaties and Ukrainian legislation. The Constitution sets that ratified 
international treaties become integral part of national legislation, but it is silent on the issue 
whether treaties or legislation have priority. The answer can be found in article 19 (2) of 
the Law on International Agreements of Ukraine. According to this law provisions of 
international agreements ratified by Ukraine shall prevail over domestic law. 
 
 
1.2.2 The conformity of the Rome Statute with the Constitution of Ukraine      
     
 
The ratification of the Statute of the International Criminal Court has challenged 
constitutional provisions in many countries and Ukraine is not an exception. Having signed 
the Rome Statute on 20 January 2000, Ukraine is on the way to ratify it. 
It is important to mention the significance of the debate on potential constitutional 
incompatibility. First, because the Statute does not provide for reservations (article 120 of 
the Statute), and therefore constitutional ‘challenges’ cannot be avoided by entering a 
reservation in relation to the contentious provision. The second factor is the procedural and 
political reality of amending a constitution.8 
At the first stage the President of Ukraine pursuant to article 151 of the Ukraine’s 
Constitution made a request for an examination of the Rome Statute’s Constitutionality. 
                                                 
7 Zakon Ukrainy pro Konstytuciynyi Sud Ukrainy (1996) [Law on the Constitutional Court of Ukraine], 
art.65, available at http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=422%2F96-%E2%F0 (English 
translation is my own) 
8 Helen Duffy, National Constitutional Compatibility and the International Criminal Court, 11 Duke J. of 
Comp. & Int’l L. (2001), 6, available at 
www.law.duke.edu/shell/cite.pl?11+Duke+J.+Comp.+&+Int'l+L.+5+pdf  
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The President’s position was that the following provisions of the Rome Statute did not 
comply with the Constitution: 
§ Surrender of citizens  
§ Irrelevance of official capacity 
§ The principle of complementarity of the International Criminal Court  
§ Enforcement of sentences in third states 
§ Exercise of the functions and authority of the ICC on the territory of 
Ukraine 
§ Empowering Assembly of State Parties to establish the Elements of 
crimes and introduce amendments to them 
§ The rules of procedure and evidence 
§ Determination of punishment by the ICC 
§ Vesting of the proof of guilt of the accused in Prosecutor elected by 
members of Assembly of State Parties.9 
Many issues raised here prove to be common to many States prior to ratification like 
complementary jurisdiction of the ICC, prohibition on extradition of nationals and 
immunities of the officials.  
On 11 July 2001 the Constitutional Court made a conclusion that most provisions of 
the Rome Statute were in conformity with the Constitution, except for the part concerning 
complementarity of the ICC, which was found as not corresponding to the Constitution.10 
Consequently relevant amendments of the Constitution should be introduced before 
Ukraine ratifies the Statute (article 9 of the Constitution).  
The first four issues mentioned above will be discussed in the following chapters. 
Concerning other issues, the Constitutional Court ruled that they did not contradict the 
Constitution referring to article 9 of the Ukraine’s Constitution. This article provides that 
international treaties agreed to be binding by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine become 
integral part of national legislation of Ukraine. In its decision the Court mentioned that an 
international treaty is ratified by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in the form of a law, 
which, by its legal nature, does not differ from other laws of Ukraine. Therefore Ukraine’s 
adherence to the Statute will not contradict to the requirement of article 75 and item 14 of 
                                                 
9 Vysnovok Konstytuciynogo Sudu Ukrainy u Spravi pro Nadannya Vysnovku Schodo Vidpovidnosti 
Konstytucii Ukrainy Rymskogo Statutu Mizhnarodnogo Kryminalnogo Sudu [Decision of the Constitutional 
Court of Ukraine on conformity of the Rome Statute with the Constitution of Ukraine], Case # 1-35/2001, 11 
July 2001, paragraph 1, unofficial translation by the ICRC is available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl-
nat.nsf/46707c419d6bdfa24125673e00508145/11d83b3284a5cc4fc1256bc2004eabfa!OpenDocument 
[hereinafter Decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine]   
10 Id., paragraph 2.1 
 8
article 92 of the Constitution, according to which the Verkhovna Rada is the sole body of 
legislative power in Ukraine which determines the judicial system, status of judges, basis 
of judicial examination, organization and activity of the office of public prosecutor etc. 
exclusively by laws.11 
Interestingly that only less than ten states from all the states that are now parties to 
the Statute have found it necessary to amend their constitutions.12 And Ukraine belongs 
now to this small group of states that decided to amend their constitutions to ensure that 
they correspond to the Rome Statute.  
 
 
1.3 The principle of complementarity and its compatibility with the 
Ukrainian Constitution 
 
 
1.3.1   Constitutional issues raised by the Rome Statute 
 
 
After the examination of the Rome Statute the Constitutional Court of Ukraine 
declared ‘the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, signed on behalf of 
Ukraine on 20 June 2000, submitted to Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine for granting consent in 
its obligation, as not corresponding to Constitution of Ukraine in the part, concerning the 
provisions of paragraph ten of the Preamble and article 1 of the Statute, whereas 
‘International Criminal Court…complements national organs of criminal justice’.13         
Some Ukrainian lawyers state that this position of the Court reflects sufficiently 
general attitude of the Ukrainian law practice towards the international law and its role in 
Ukrainian legal system.14  
Considering this issue, the Court relied first on the articles 124 and 125 of the 
Ukrainian Constitution. According to article 124, justice in Ukraine is administrated 
exclusively by the courts. Judicial proceedings are performed by the Constitutional Court 
of Ukraine and Ukrainian courts of general jurisdiction. The system of courts of general 
jurisdiction consists of the Supreme Court of Ukraine, supreme specialized courts, 
appellate and local courts (article 125). The delegation of the functions of the courts and 
                                                 
11 Decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, supra note 9, paragraph 2.4 - 2.8 
12 States’ Responses to Issues Arising from the ICC Statute: Constitutional, Sovereignty, Judicial 
Cooperation  and Criminal Law (Roy S. Lee ed., 2005), xxi  
13 Decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, supra note 9, final conclusion 
14 Dmytro Kuleba, Scho Stalosya z Rymskym Statutom v Ukraini, 4 Ukrainskyi Chasopys Mizhnarodnogo 
Prava (2003), p.39 [hereinafter Kuleba] 
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also the appropriation of these functions by other bodies or officials is not permitted 
(article 124(1). Pursuant to article 125 it is prohibited to establish emergency and special 
courts. 
Referring to paragraph ten of the Preamble and article 1 of the ICC Statute, the 
Constitutional Court concludes that possibility of such complementarity is not envisaged 
by Ukraine’s Constitution section VIII ‘Justice’ and do not comply with article 124 of 
Ukraine’s Constitution.15 
In its decision the Court mentioned that nature of the ICC differs significantly from 
international judicial organs, particularly the European Court of Human rights whereas the 
right to petition for protection of their rights and freedom is stipulated in part four of article 
55 of Ukraine’s Constitution. Such international judicial organs initiate investigation only 
following petitions from persons, whereas the person may petition them only after all 
national remedies for legal protection have been exhausted. The Court may exercise its 
functions and powers, as provided in this Statute, on the territory of any State Party (article 
4 (2) of the Rome Statute) and accepts for handling not only those cases referred to it by 
application of the participating state but also on to its own initiative, when ‘the state is 
unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution’.16    
A dissent opinion of two judges (Ivaschenko and Selivon) was added to the 
conclusion of the Constitutional Court. Though many commentators find this opinion too 
radical17, some stands of the opinion should be mentioned.  
In the opinion of Ivaschenko and Selivon it lacks common sense to state that 
paragraph 10 of the Preamble and article 1 of the Statute are not compatible with the 
Constitution of Ukraine and at the same time to recognize other articles of the Statute 
which specify complementary character of the Court as compatible.18 It is difficult not to 
agree with this opinion. The Constitutional Court mentioned several times19 in its 
conclusion that principle of complementarity is reflected in many articles of the Rome 
Statute. For instance, in paragraph 2.1 the Court mentions that article 4(2) of the Statute 
specifies complementary character of the ICC.20 Further the Constitutional Court in 
paragraph 2.4 concludes that article 4(2) is in conformity with the Constitution of Ukraine. 
                                                 
15 Decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, supra note 9, paragraph 2.1 
16 Id. 
17 Kuleba, supra note 14,  at 39 
18 Okrema Dumka Suddiv Konstytuciynogo Sudu Ukrainy Ivaschenka V.I. ta Selivona M.F. Stosovno 
Vysnovku Konstytuciynogo Sudu Ukrainy u Spravi pro Nadannya Vysnovku Schodo Vidpovidnosti 
Konstytucii Ukrainy Rymskogo Statutu Mizhnarodnogo Kryminalnogo Sudu [Dissent opinion of judges 
Ivaschenko and Selivon] (English translation is my own)  
19 Decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, supra note 9, paragraph 2.1, 2.2.3, 2.3.3 
20 ‘The Court may exercise its functions and powers, as provided in this Statute, on the territory of any State 
Party…’ 
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Position of the Court on this point is controversial. Other issues raised in the dissent 
opinion will be discussed in the following chapters. 
   The decision of the Constitutional Court is criticized by many Ukrainian lawyers. 
The Court explaining the reason why the International Criminal Court cannot complement 
national organs of criminal justice does not consider the nature of complementarity. The 
expression ‘the ICC shall be complementary’ have been used separately from its content 
without taking into account the nature of phenomenon which it describes.21  
A thorough discussion of the nature of the Court’s jurisdiction is not the main 
objective of this paper, but some analysis here is still necessary. 
According W. Schabas explains, ‘the term ‘complementarity’ may be somewhat of 
misnomer, because what is established is a relationship between international and national 
justice that is far from ‘complementary’. Rather the two systems function in opposition and 
to some extent with hostility to respect to each other’.22 Though complementarity emerges 
explicitly only in paragraph ten of the preamble and in article 1 of the ICC Statute and 
other articles do not refer directly to it, the central provision regulating complementarity 
can be found in article 17, which addresses the relationship between national legal systems 
and the ICC. Moreover, article 17 is not a stand-alone provision and is linked to the 
complex system of inter-related articles 12 to 15, 18, 19, 20 and 53.23 Pursuant to article 17 
(1) of the Rome Statute a case is inadmissible when it is being investigated or prosecuted 
by a state that has jurisdiction over it, or when the case has already been investigated and 
the state has decided not to prosecute. The Court may only proceed when the state is 
unwilling or unable genuinely to carry such proceedings out.  
The ICC is not a supranational court or a court of appeal. It has no competence to 
overrule or review the decision of any national court and has no precedence over national 
courts. The Statute encourages states to exercise their jurisdiction over the ICC crimes and 
stipulates therefore that ‘it is the duty of every state’ to exercise its criminal jurisdiction 
over those responsible for international crimes.24 Thus, national courts of the state with 
jurisdiction have priority over the ICC and the Statute crimes. Each state decides when to 
exercise jurisdiction over the Statute crime. Neither national courts nor the ICC submit to 
each other and the ICC in no way replaces national courts if they proceed effectively.  
Pursuant to article 17 of the Rome Statute, the Court’s jurisdiction is only 
complementary and may do so when state fails to investigate or undertake judicial 
                                                 
21 Kuleba, supra note 14, at 39 
22 William A. Schabas, An Introduction to the International Criminal Court (2d ed. 2004), p.85 
23 Florian Razesberger, The International Criminal Court: the Principle of Complementarity (2006), pp.28-29 
24 Roy S. Lee, The International Criminal Court: the Making of the Rome Statute: Issues, Negotiations, 
Results (1999) pp. 27, 43-74, 127-42  
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procedures genuinely after an ICC crime has been committed. The ICC may be called a 
court of last resort, because it can only pursue cases when state fails to do so.  
The Constitutional Court of Ukraine, considering constitutional provisions regarding 
the exclusive competence of national authorities, concluded that this precludes any 
delegation to a jurisdiction complementary to the national system. In my opinion, these 
provisions could be interpreted in favor of the Statute. Defining the relationship between 
national authorities and the ICC, it should be taken into account that the Constitution was 
adopted before the establishment of the ICC. Besides article 17 provides for inbuilt 
safeguards that preserve national interests and judicial integrity on the domestic level.25  
Primacy of national courts is guaranteed by the Statute and the ICC only assumes 
jurisdiction where state fails to do so.  
Interesting interpretation of the complementarity principle was used by the French 
Constitutional Council. According to its opinion, the ICC cannot act on a case when a state 
has decided to act in good faith.26 The Council concluded that the restriction to the 
principle of complementarity in the case where a state deliberately evaded its obligations 
was derived from the rule pacta sunt servanda.27 Only when state violates its obligations 
under the Statute, the ICC may intervene. In my opinion such interpretation of the principle 
is not correct, because the ICC Statute does not obligate states to investigate or prosecute 
and states are free to choose whether to do this or not. That is why the question is not about 
pacta sund servanda. The principle of complementarity governs the ICC’s jurisdiction.  
A part of the conclusion of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine which is criticized by 
the Ukrainian lawyers is subparagraph 4 and 5 of paragraph 2.1, where the Court mentions 
difference between the ICC and other international judicial organs, particularly the 
European Court of Human Rights.  
According to article 55 of the Constitution Ukrainian nationals have the right to 
appeal for the protection of their rights and freedoms to the ECHR. Following the standing 
of the Court, the difference between the International Criminal Court and other 
international judicial institutions that do not conflict with the Constitution lies in a way that 
the latter institutes proceedings: a) by appeal of the person and b) after exhausting all 
                                                 
25 Sharon A. Williams, Article 17: Issues of Admissibility, in Commentary on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: observer’s notes, article by article (Otto Triffterer ed., 1999), p.384 
26 Roy S. Lee, States’ Responses: Issues and Solutions, in States’ Responses to Issues Arising from the ICC 
Statute, supra note 12, at 13 
27 The ICRC, Issues Raised with Regard to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court by National 
Constitutional Courts, Supreme Courts and Councils of State 18, available at 
www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/59RLJW/$FILE/Issues_Raised_with_Regard_to_the_ICC_Statut
e.pdf [hereinafter Issues Raised with Regard to the Rome Statute by National Constitutional Courts] 
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domestic legal remedies. But it is important to take into consideration that the ECHR may 
also receive applications from States, non-governmental organization and group of 
individuals.28  
Analyzing the opinion of the Constitutional Court, and particularly paragraph 2.1 of 
this opinion, Ukrainian scholar D. Kuleba comes to conclusion that principle of exhausting 
of legal domestic remedies and principle of complementarity have the same basis and 
functions: they function only when national means of legal protection do not render justice 
because of ineffectiveness, unavailability or unwillingness.29 It seems that both the 
International Criminal Court and the European Court of Human Rights are ‘supplementary 
remedies by character for protection of human and citizen’s rights and freedoms’. D. 
Kuleba states that ‘their nature in relation to the national legal system will be the same: 
both institutions help systems of national legal means to carry out the functions of every 
judicial body which is to dispense justice’.30  
This position is true from the point of view of justice’s recipient. However, there is 
still a difference between the ICC and the ECHR. While the European Convention of 
Human Rights creates substantive obligations upon State Parties, the ICC Statute does not. 
The ICC tries individuals responsible for the most serious international crimes, and States 
Parties have only the duty to cooperate with the Court. Consequently, the position of 
commentators stating that if Ukraine has recognized the ECHR then it is reasonable to 
recognize the ICC is arguable.  
 
 
 
1.3.2   Overcoming the inconsistency 
 
 
According to the report of the European Commission for Democracy through Law, 
states may consider several solutions for the ratification of the Statute of Rome. These may 
include the following:  
- insertion of a new article in the constitution, which allows all 
relevant constitutional problems  to be settled, and avoids the need to include 
exceptions for all the relevant articles (used by France and Luxembourg); 
- revision of all constitutional articles that must be changed; 
                                                 
28 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Council of Europe, art 33, 34 
29 Kuleba, supra note 14, at 44  
30 Id. 
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- introduce and/or apply a special procedure of approval by 
Parliament, as a consequence of which the Statute may be ratified, despite the 
fact that some articles are in conflict with the Constitution; 
- interpreting certain provisions of the Constitution in a way to avoid 
conflict with the ICC Statute.31 
Pursuant to article 9 of the Constitution of Ukraine, if international treaty does not 
comply with Ukraine’s Constitution, adherence of Ukraine to this treaty is possible only 
after introduction of corresponding changes into it. Thus the third alternative mentioned 
above is not an option here. The amendment of the Constitution is the only way for 
Ukraine to overcome the inconsistency today.  
In my opinion, the interpretive approach could be used in earlier stage, when the 
Constitutional Court of Ukraine considered the Rome Statute for the subject of its 
compliance to Ukraine’s Constitution. Many states have found ways to interpret the 
relevant provisions in such a way to avoid inconsistencies.32 While judges of the Ukraine’s 
Constitutional Court interpreted provisions concerning immunities and surrender of 
nationals in a creative way, they concluded that complementarity of the ICC was 
incompatible with the Constitution without broad argumentation.33 Now, when the Court 
has come to conclusion, Ukraine cannot ratify the Statute of Rome without constitutional 
amendments. However, the law on the Constitutional Court of Ukraine contains specific 
provision. According to this provision the Court may reconsider the case provided that the 
new circumstances of the case that existed at the moment the Court considered the case 
became evident.34 The ratification of the Rome Statute by Ukraine can possibly happen 
sooner when the Court reconsiders the case rather than changing the Constitution.  
The procedure of the constitutional amendment in Ukraine is complicated and 
lingering35 and some scholars even say that it will be unreal to change the Constitution36. 
The amendment should be introduced and the issue is how to do it effectively. Some states 
                                                 
31 Report on Constitutional Issues Raised by the Ratification of the Rome Statute of the ICC, adopted by the 
Venice Commission on 45th Plenary meeting (2000), available at http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2001/CDL-
INF(2001)001-E.asp [hereinafter Report of Venice Commission] (The European Commission for Democracy 
through Law, better known as the Venice Commission, is the Council of Europe's advisory body on 
constitutional matters) 
32 Lee, supra note 25, at 11 
33 Vyacheslav Manukyan, Ne Vse Dorogi Vedut v Gorod Gaaga, 39(249) Yuridicheskaya Praktika,  original 
version available at http://www.yurpractika.com/article.php?id=10004116 (English translation is my own) 
34 Law on the Constitutional Court of Ukraine, supra note 7, art.68 
35 Oleksander Lavrynovych, Osnovni Problemni Pytannya Implementacii Polozhen Rymskogo Statutu 
Mizhnarodnogo Kryminalnogo Sudu do Zakonodavstva Ukrainy ta Shlyahy ih Vyrishennya, 4 Ukrainskyi 
Chasopys Mizhnarodnogo Prava (2003), p.14  
36 Kuleba, supra note 14, at 46 
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could make it possible to change their constitutions and experience of these states is a 
valuable experience for Ukraine. 
France amended its constitution by provision which is general in nature. The 
constitution was subsequently amended by inserting a new article that provided: ‘The 
Republic may recognize the jurisdiction of the ICC as provided in the treaty signed on 18 
July 1998’.37 Similar approach was taken by Luxembourg. A new provision stating that 
‘The provisions of the Constitution do not hinder the approval of the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court…and the performance of the obligations arising from the 
Statute according to the provisions provided therein’, was added to the article 18 of the 
Luxembourg’s Constitution.38  
Taking into account the experience of these states and the opinion of the 
Constitutional Court, Ukrainian experts suggest two options of amending the chapter VIII 
of the Ukraine’s Constitution. First option is to expand article 124 of the Constitution by 
inserting a provision of the following content: Ukraine may recognize the jurisdiction of 
international judicial bodies on the basis of international treaties that are in force, agreed to 
be binding by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine39. Second option is to add provision 
providing that the International Criminal Court complements courts of general jurisdiction 
of Ukraine and its functioning is governed by the provisions of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court40. 
 Both options are presented in two different draft laws on amendments to the 
Constitution. Pursuant to article 159 of the Ukraine’s Constitution a draft law on 
introducing amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine should be considered first by the 
Constitutional Court of Ukraine in conformity with the draft law within requirements of 
the Constitution. When a decision on this issue is made one of the draft laws will be 
considered by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.  
Both presented alternatives seem to be acceptable. Provision providing that the ICC 
complements courts of general jurisdiction and that its functioning is governed by the 
provisions of the Rome Statute will solve the problem of non-correspondence of the 
Constitution to the Rome Statute and at the same time outline the legal basis for its 
activity. But the first alternative gives the opportunity to avoid constitutional amendments 
in the future, in case of ratification of other similar international treaties.  
                                                 
37 Issues Raised with Regard to the Rome Statute by National Constitutional Courts, supra note 27, at 1 
38 Id. at 5 
39 Lavrynovych, supra note 35, at 17 
40 Kostyantyn Gryschenko, Mizhnarodnyi Kryminalnyi Sud, 4 Ukrainskyi Chasopys Mizhnarodnogo Prava  
(2003), p.12  
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2 Immunities 
 
 
2.1  Irrelevance of the official capacity under the Rome Statute 
 
 
2.1.1  Article 27 of the ICC Statute 
 
 
In the context of the individual criminal responsibility for crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court41, often these crimes are committed with 
direct or indirect participation of persons acting in their official capacity. Hindrances that 
may arise on the way to international prosecution of these persons are the rules that grant 
them immunity from persecution. Immunities that may in this case come into play can be 
divided into three groups: 1) immunities derived from customary international law; 2) 
immunities granted by international treaty rules; 3) those envisaged in national 
legislation.42 
Today it seems undisputable that senior state officials may be held accountable for 
acts performed in the discharge of their official duties.43 The principle was confirmed in 
founding instruments of the Nuremberg Tribunal, Tokio Tribunal, ICTY and ICTR. Today 
this principle is recognized in the Rome Statute in article 27, which declares that rules in 
either national or international law that create immunities or otherwise shelter individuals 
from criminal prosecution are of no effect before the Court.  
The actual wording of the article 27 is the following: ‘the Statute shall apply equally 
to all persons without any distinction based on official capacity…[which] shall in no case 
exempt from criminal responsibility, nor shall it constitute a ground for reduction of 
sentence. Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the official capacity 
of a person…shall not bar the Court from exercising its jurisdiction over such person’. 
The purpose of this article was to clarify the scope of individual criminal 
responsibility for crimes under international law.44 The main effect of article 27 of the ICC 
Statute is to establish that the official capacity of a person does not relieve him of 
                                                 
41 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, preamble paragraph 9 [hereinafter The 
Rome Statute] 
42 See Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (2003), p.264 
43
 Id. at 267 
44 Otto Triffterer, article 27: Irrelevance of official capacity, in Commentary on the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: Observer’s Notes, Article by Article (Otto Triffterer ed., 1999) p.507 
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individual criminal responsibility and it eliminates a substantive defense that may be put 
forward by state officials.45 
The first paragraph of article 27 provides that state officials are subject to prosecution 
by the Court even if they acted in their official capacity, official status of defendant does 
not exclude him from the jurisdiction of the ICC.46 Thus the first part of article 27 of the 
Rome Statute deals with substantive responsibility of state officials for international crimes 
rather than issues of immunity.47 The second paragraph contains an explicit denial of 
international and national law immunities. As Otto Triffterer states in his analysis of this 
paragraph the special procedural rules mentioned there are those granting exemption from 
criminal responsibility ratione personae and/or materiae. It also makes no difference 
whether such rules exclude criminal responsibility or only protect person by a procedural 
rule against the exercise of domestic jurisdiction like arrest and prosecution before national 
courts. Such rules include all national regulations even if they rank as constitutional law 
and all rules of general and special international law.48 
Article 27 has therefore two effects: first, no immunity will prevent an individual 
from being prosecuted for crimes which fall under the jurisdiction of the ICC and the 
second, no immunity will prevent a person from being surrendered to the ICC on the 
request of the Court. The intention of the article is to nullify any existing immunities 
conferred to individuals with official capacity for the purposes of prosecutions before the 
Court.  
Consequently, on the one hand Article 27 constitutes a waiver of national law 
immunities and States parties are therefore obliged to arrest and surrender their own 
officials even if those officials would otherwise be entitled to immunity under national law. 
On the other hand State parties to the Statute must not respect any immunity with regard to 
nationals of other states parties when complying with the request of the ICC for arrest or 
surrender.49  
And as the concluding remark, article 27 of the ICC Statute does not provide for a 
requirement for the States to abolish immunities provided for in the domestic legislation. 
States parties to the Statute do not need to eliminate all existing forms of immunity for 
                                                 
45 Hazel Fox, The Law of State Immunity (2002), pp.429-430 
46 See Dapo Akande, International Law Immunities and the International Criminal Court, 98(3) Am. J. Int’l 
L. (2004), pp.419-420  
47 Id. at 419 
48 See Triffterer, supra note 44, p.512. For more information on the issue of immunities ratione 
personae/materiae, see Cassese, supra note 42, at 264-273 
49 See Steffen Wirth, Immunities, Related Problems, and Article 98 of the Rome Statute, in The International 
Criminal Court (Olympia  Bekou, Robert Cryer ed., 2004), pp.352-353 (The author also points out that the 
scope of article 27 is limited only to state parties, immunitites of non-party states cannot be abrogated by the 
Statute because of the rule of pacta tertiis – a treaty does not create obligations or rights for a third state ) 
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their representatives.50 The Rome Statute simply requires an exception to the general rule 
of the immunity to be provided for by the parties, if they have not already done so. 
 
 
2.1.2  States’ responses  
 
 
Constitutions of many states contain provisions providing immunities to certain 
officials, such as head of state, governmental officials, members of the parliament etc. The 
scope and extent of constitutional immunities may be different: some constitutions grant 
immunities that are strictly attached to certain acts, others confer immunities from any 
penal process. Taking into account the fact that most constitutions were drafted before the 
ICC was established, immunities mentioned in these constitutions may contravene article 
27 of the Rome Statute and states find different solutions to this problem. 
According to the Manual for the ratification and implementation of the Rome Statute, 
where there is a concern about inconsistencies between the Statute and national 
constitutions over immunities, states have taken one of the following steps: 
• amending their constitution 
• interpreting the national constitution 
• lefting the issue for the future when it was judged highly unlikely to have any real 
application.(the Netherlands, Norway and Spain essentially did this with respect to 
their monarchs).51 
States, like the Czech Republic, Ireland, Latvia, Belgium, France, Luxembourg and 
Liechtenstein decided that constitutional amendment is necessary. The French 
Constitutional Council held that, in view of particular regimes of penal responsibility of the 
President, members of the Parliament and members of the Assembly established in articles 
26, 68 and 68-1 of the French Constitution, article 27 of the Rome Statute was contrary to 
the Constitution.52 As it was mentioned in previous chapter, France introduced a general 
provision to its Constitution that permitted avoiding changing of every particular article 
that was not compatible with the Statute. Similar approach was taken by Luxembourg.53 
                                                 
50 See The International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy, International Criminal 
Court: Manual for the Ratification and Implementation of the Rome Statute (3d ed. 2008), p.21, available at 
http://www.iccnow.org/documents/ICC_Manual_-_March_2008_-_ICLR.pdf  
51 Id. at 21-22 
52 Issues Raised with Regard to the Rome Statute by National Constitutional Courts, supra note 27, at 1 
53 See for details Issues Raised with Regard to the Rome Statute by National Constitutional Courts, supra 
note 27, at 5 
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The Czech Republic made its constitutional amendment by a specific provision, stating 
that no special conditions provided for the prosecution of deputy, senator, the President of 
the Republic, and judge of the Constitution Court shall apply as regards crimes mentioned 
in the ICC Statue.54 
As Helen Duffy states, amendment does not necessarily indicate rejection of the 
arguments for harmonious interpretation. While in some states constitutional amendment 
was indeed necessary for consistency with the Statute, in others amendment may have been 
considered the preferable – rather than strictly necessary – route. This step was taken in 
order to minimize the possibility of future challenges or perceptions of inconsistency.55 
At the same time many states have decided that amendment is not necessary. These 
states chose the way of authoritative interpretation of the constitutional provisions in order 
to avoid conflict with the Statute. These are countries like Azerbaijan, Argentina, Brazil, 
Canada, Cambodia, Finland, New Zeland, Portugal, Ukraine and the United Kingdom56. 
The Venice Commission examined the practice of states on this issue and suggested 
three possible ways of interpretation of constitutions. According to the first one, states may 
interpret the relevant constitutional provisions in a way that those provisions construed as 
conferring immunity by reason of person’s ‘official capacity’ only in the national and not 
international courts. This would amount to establishing two tiers of responsibility of office-
holders, at the national and international levels. A state may also maintain that a tacit 
exception from immunity was inherent in its constitution. A head of state or government 
who commits the most serious crime of concern to the international community probably 
violates the fundamental principles of his country’s constitution, therefore he cannot expect 
to be protected by the constitution. And the third possible interpretation would be to 
maintain that lifting the immunity of heads of state or government has become a customary 
practice in public international law. 57  This trend in international law was confirmed by the 
House of Lords in decision on General Pinochet’s immunity, as well as in Arrest Warrant 
case (Congo v. Belgium) by the ICJ.58 
                                                 
54 See Government Bill on the constitutional law amending the constitutional law of the Czech National 
Council No. 1/1993 Coll., Constitution of the Czech Republic, as amended by constitutional law no.347/1997 
Coll. 
55 Duffy, supra note 8, at 11 (the article explores arguments as to how the constitutional provisions can be 
read consistently with the Statute) 
56 For more details in respect of some of these states, see States’ Responses to Issues Arising from the ICC 
Statute, supra 12 
57 See Report of Venice Commission, supra note 31 
58 See Regina v. Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and others EX Parte Pinochet (on 
appeal from a Divisional Court of the Queen's Bench Division), the House of Lords, judgement of 25 
November 1998; Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), 
International Court of Justice, judgment of 14 February 2002, paragraph 56-61  
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Consequently, practice of states in dealing with the problem of incompatibility of 
constitutional immunities with article 27 of the Rome Statute is different. Every state 
chooses its own measures to resolve the problem and this practice may be useful for states 
that are still resolving the problem.   
  
 
2.2  Conformity with the constitutional provisions 
 
 
2.2.1  Issue of immunities in the Ukrainian Constitution 
 
 
2.2.1.1 President of Ukraine 
 
 
 
The President of Ukraine is the guarantor of state sovereignty and the territorial 
integrity of Ukraine, as well as the Constitution of Ukraine and human and citizens' rights 
and freedoms.59 Realization of these and other constitutional provisions that determine 
legal status of the President and his responsibilities is impossible without proper legal 
protection. Such protection is given by article 105 of the Ukraine’s Constitution. 
According to this article ‘the President of Ukraine enjoys the right of immunity during the 
term of office’.  
According to the Constitution, the President may be held accountable only on 
specific conditions. Article 111 stipulates that the Ukrainian President can be discharged 
from the post by the Verkhovna Rada by the procedure of impeachment in the event that he 
or she commits state treason or other crime. The issue of the discharging of the President 
of Ukraine from office by the procedure of impeachment is initiated by the majority of the 
constitutional composition of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. To carry out the 
investigation, the Parliament of Ukraine establishes a special temporary investigatory 
commission whose composition includes a special prosecutor and special investigators. 
The conclusions and proposals of the temporary investigatory commission are considered 
in meetings of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. If there is a legal basis the Verkhovna 
Rada of Ukraine adopts a decision on impeachment of the President of Ukraine if voted for 
by no less than two-thirds of its constitutional composition.60  
                                                 
59 Constitution of Ukraine art.102 (2) 
60 See Constitution of Ukraine art.111 
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In order to understand the nature of the personal immunity of the President, some 
decisions of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine should be taken into consideration, 
because it is the only body that provides the official interpretation of the Constitution of 
Ukraine.61 
In its decision on immunity and impeachment of the President of Ukraine, the 
Constitutional Court concluded that the immunity of the President should be understood as 
part of his constitutional status. It intends to provide conditions for the realization of his 
responsibilities. The Court has also emphasized that the President’s right to immunity 
ceases when the President steps off the office.62  
 The Court states that while in office the President cannot be held accountable and no 
criminal proceeding can be initiated against him. The procedure of impeachment 
established by the Constitution of Ukraine is the only way to call the President to the 
constitutional liability. And by its legal nature this constitutional process is extrajudicial 
and has nothing to do with criminal proceedings.63  
Consequently, the immunity of the President of Ukraine is not absolute. He may be 
deprived of immunity through the impeachment in case of violation of the Constitution.  
 
 
2.2.1.2   People’s deputies and judges 
 
The People’s Deputies and judges are the two categories of state officials that are 
conferred immunity by the Constitution of Ukraine. 
Provisions of article 76 of the Constitution of Ukraine stipulate that ‘the Verkhovna 
Rada of Ukraine consists of 450 People’s Deputies of Ukraine who are elected for a four-
year term’. The immunity of People’s Deputies of Ukraine is guaranteed by article 80 of 
the Constitution. It also provides that deputies ‘shall not be held criminally liable, detained 
or arrested without the consent of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine’.64 
The Constitutional Court of Ukraine addressed the issue of Deputies’ immunities in 
several cases. As the Court explained in its decision on Deputies’ immunities, the specific 
                                                 
61 Constitution of Ukraine art.147 (2): ‘The Constitutional Court of Ukraine decides on issues of conformity 
of laws and other legal acts with the Constitution of Ukraine and provides the official interpretation of the 
Constitution of Ukraine and the laws of Ukraine’ 
62 See Rishennya Konstytuciynogo Sudu Ukrainy u Spravi pro Oficiyne Tlumachennya Polozhen Chastyny 
Pershoi statti 105, Chastyny Pershoi Statti 111 Konstytucii Ukrainy (Sprava schodo nedotorkannosti ta 
impichmentu prezydenta Ukrainy), #19-рп/2003 (2003) [Decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine on 
the immunity and impeachment of the President of Ukraine], available at http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-
bin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=v019p710-03 (English translation is my own)   
63 Id. 
64 See Constitution of Ukraine art.80 (1) and 80(3) 
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purpose of the immunity is to secure that the deputy performs his duties effectively and 
without obstruction.65 The Court also mentioned that Deputies enjoy immunities from the 
moment they are elected until they resign.  
Explaining the nature of the Deputies immunities in the same decision, the 
Constitutional Court held that immunities of the Peoples’ Deputies are not personal 
privileges of the deputies but of public and legal nature. 
The Court interpreted the article 80 of the Constitution of Ukraine as establishing a 
special procedure of bringing People’s Deputies to account, their detention and arrest. Such 
measures may be applied to the Deputy only with the consent of the Verkhovna Rada.66 In 
its decision on guaranties of Deputy’s immunity, the Constitutional Curt held that the aim 
of deputy’s immunity is not only to protect the deputy from unlawful interference in his 
activity but also to assist the appropriate functioning of the Verkhovna Rada.67  
Hence the immunity of the People’s Deputies is not absolute. They can be held 
accountable but only on specific conditions.  
The Constitution also guarantees immunity of judges according to article 126 of the 
Constitution. Paragraph 3 of article 126 stipulates that a judge shall not be detained or 
arrested prior to court’s decision is made and only with the consent of the Verkhovna 
Rada. 
 
2.2.2 The Opinion of the Constitutional Court 
 
 
Upon the request for an examination of the Rome Statute’s constitutionality, the 
question whether article 27 of the Rome Statute corresponds to paragraphs 1 and 3 of 
article 80 and paragraph 1 of article 105, as well as paragraphs 1 and 3 of article 126 of the 
Ukraine’s Constitution was raised, which guarantee immunity of the President of Ukraine, 
People’s Deputies and judges. 
                                                 
65 Rishennya Konstytuciynogo Sudu Ukrainy schodo oficiynogo Tlumachennya Polozhen’ Chastyny Tret’oi 
Statti 80 Konstytucii Ukrainy (Sprava pro Deputatsku nedotorkannist), # 9-рп/99 (1999) [Decision of the 
Constitutional Court of Ukraine on Deputy’s Immunity], available at http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-
bin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=v009p710-99 (English translation is my own) 
66 See Id., part 4 
67 See Rishennya Konstytuciynogo Sudu Pro Oficiyne Tlumachennya Polozhen Chastyn Pershoi, Tret’oi 
Statti 80 Konstytucii Ukrainy, Chastyny Pershoi Statti 26, Chastyn Pershoi, Drugoi, Tret’oi Statti 27 Zakonu 
Ukrainy ‘Pro Status Narodnogo Deputata Ukrainy’ (Sprava pro Garantii Deputatskoi Nedotorkannosti), # 12-
рп/2003 (2003) [Decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine on guarantees of Deputy’s immunity], 
available at http://zakon.rada.gov.ua/cgi-bin/laws/main.cgi?nreg=v012p710-03 (English translation is my 
own) 
 22
In its opinion the Constitutional Court relied on article 18 of the Constitution of 
Ukraine. Article 18 stipulates that international activities of Ukraine are based on generally 
recognized principles and norms of international law. The Court has mentioned that one of 
these principles is the principle of diligent performance of international obligations which 
aroused in form of international and legal custom ‘pacta sund servanda’ and received its 
reflection in numerous international agreements.68  
The Court has concluded that ‘the establishment of responsibility for committing 
majority of crimes stipulated by the Rome Statute is an international and legal obligation of 
Ukraine, according to other international and legal documents that entered into force for 
[Ukraine]’. Particularly, it is the Convention on prevention and punishment of the crimes 
of genocide of 9 December 1948, Geneva Convention relative to protection of civilian 
persons in time of war of 12 August 1949, Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of 
prisoners of war of 12 August 1949, Convention for the protection of cultural property in 
the event of armed conflict of 14 May 1954, the International Convention on the 
suppression and punishment of the crime of apartheid of 30 November 1973, Convention 
against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of 10 December 1984.  
The Constitutional Court observed that ‘the Statute reflects the majority of provisions 
that determine crimes listed in the abovementioned and other conventions Ukraine is part 
of. Provisions of the Statute prohibiting the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, 
war crimes, the crime of aggression are considered nowadays as a customary rule of 
international law which was recognized by international organs. Therefore, their criminal 
nature according to article 18 of Ukraine’s Constitution does not depend on Ukraine’s 
adherence to the Statute and its entry into force’.69   
It is the Court’s standing that immunities of the President of Ukraine, People’s 
Deputies and judges concern only national jurisdiction and may not be an obstacle to 
exercise jurisdiction by the International Criminal Court with regard to those who commit 
crimes stipulated by the Statute. ‘It complies completely with international obligations of 
Ukraine’.70 In the view of the Court immunity of official persons is connected with their 
performance of important state functions, it is not their privilege and therefore it cannot be 
considered as a guarantee of their impunity. Immunity of the President, People’s Deputies 
                                                 
68 Decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine on the conformity of the Rome Statute with the 
Constitution of Ukraine, supra note 9, paragraph 2.2 
69 Id. 
70 Id., paragraph 2.2.1 
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and judges stipulate only specific conditions for instituting criminal proceedings against 
them.71 
It follows from the Court’s position that Ukraine is aware of its obligation of 
international criminal responsibility for its state officials since the USSR ratified the 
Genocide Convention back in 1954. According to article 4 of the Genocide Convention 
‘persons committing genocide…shall be punished whether they are constitutionally 
responsible rulers, public officials or private individuals’. This compatibility issue has 
already been resolved when Ukraine ratified other international treaties that establish the 
duty to prosecute or extradite persons regardless of the official status of the accused. 
Ukraine is one of the states where the provisions of international treaties in the field of 
human rights take precedence over conflicting provisions of the Constitution.72 
In my opinion, the Court rightly pointed out the objective of immunities of the 
Ukrainian state officials. Although the Constitution of Ukraine does not stipulate it 
expressly, immunities of the President, Deputies and judges are there to protect them from 
interference in the exercising of their functions. But the Constitution does not guarantee 
impunity for international crimes. 
While most Ukrainian lawyers seem to agree with the approach taken by the Court, 
the judges Ivaschenko and Selivon disagree with the opinion of the Constitutional Court, 
and expressed their position in their dissent opinion.73 
In the view of Ivaschenko and Selivon, any international legal norm should be 
considered in the light of the supremacy of the Constitution. This principle is envisaged in 
article 9 (2) of the Constitution. According to it ‘the conclusion of international treaties 
that contravene the Constitution of Ukraine is possible only after introducing relevant 
amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine’. In accordance with the principle of 
supremacy, the Constitution provides for mechanism of preceding and following control of 
the constitutionality of international treaties. ‘The Constitutional Court of Ukraine, on the 
appeal of the President of Ukraine or the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, provides 
opinions on the conformity with the Constitution of Ukraine of international treaties of 
Ukraine that are in force, or the international treaties submitted to the Verkhovna Rada of 
Ukraine for granting agreement on their binding nature’.74 Thus, the authors of the dissent 
opinion say that the application of arguments in support of constitutionality of provisions 
of the Statute referring to treaties that are binding for Ukraine is possible only in case if the 
                                                 
71 Id., paragraph 2.2.2 
72 See Report of Venice Commission, supra note 31 (It is mentioned that this situation is peculiar to states of 
Central and Eastern Europe) 
73 See Dissent Opinion, supra note 18, paragraph 2 
74 Constitution of Ukraine art.151 
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Constitutional Court of Ukraine made a decision on conformity of these treaties with the 
Constitution. 
Another part of the decision of the Constitutional Court that is questioned is the 
conclusion that immunity of Ukrainian officials concerns only national jurisdiction. 
Ivaschenko and Selivon argue that following this line of argumentation norms of 
international law and constitutional norms operate separately from each other and each of 
them have their own field of application. Following this approach there cannot be any 
contradictions between national and international laws, and then there is no need in 
constitutional provisions that provide for interrelation between the Constitution of Ukraine 
and international treaties.  
It is difficult not to agree with the dissent opinion when it comes to the first argument 
expressed earlier. The Constitution of Ukraine clearly provides for its supremacy.  
Consequently, interpreting the constitutional provisions the Court may rely only on the 
international treaties that are in conformity with the Constitution, in other words the 
Constitutional Court gave the opinion on the conformity of these treaties.  
As for the second argument, it is difficult to agree with what was argued in the 
dissent opinion. What I think the Constitutional Court meant was two different levels of 
responsibility of state officials – one at the national and the other one at the international 
levels. And thus this operation of immunities on different levels has nothing to do with the 
separation of international and domestic law. The matter concerns separation of 
responsibilities: when responsibility of the official is exception at national level it does not 
apply at the international level.  
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3. Surrender of Ukrainian nationals to the ICC 
 
3.1 Nature of surrender 
 
 
The Rome Statute provides that: ‘The Court may transmit a request for the arrest and 
surrender of a person…[and] State Parties shall, in accordance with the provisions of this 
part [of the Statute] and the procedure under their national law, comply with the request for 
arrest and surrender’.75  
The surrender of suspects and accused is one of the core obligations of states to the 
ICC and is significant to its proper functioning. Any state party is obligated to cooperate 
whenever the arrest or surrender of a person suspected of committing a Statute crime is 
sought. The surrender procedure applies both to nationals and non-nationals and the issue 
of compatibility may arise in this case since constitutions of many states prohibit the 
extradition of nationals. It is clear from provisions of article 89 that states may not use 
constitutional prohibition against extradition as a ground for refusing surrender.76  
Three possible options were discussed during the negotiations of the Rome Statute, 
regarding the term that could refer to the delivery of a person to the ICC: extradition, 
transfer, surrender. In most states extradition was interpreted to refer to the process for the 
delivery of individuals to another state for prosecution. The term ‘transfer’ was considered 
as a process in which the individual is simply arrested and transferred to the ICC. For some 
states the term ‘extradition’ was unacceptable because of constitutional restrictions, others 
could not accept the term ‘transfer’ because that would mean restriction of individual’s 
liberty without safeguards associated with extradition. Eventually the term ‘surrender’ was 
adopted as a compromise.77   
Both the definition of surrender and extradition were inserted in article 102 of the 
Rome Statute for the purpose to ensure that ‘traditional extradition law is not applicable to 
the special surrender regime’.78 The article 102 states: ‘For the purposes of this Statute: 
a) ‘surrender’ means the delivering up of a person by a State to the Court,   
pursuant to this Statute. 
                                                 
75 The Rome Statute art. 89(1) 
76 See Bert Swart, Arrest and Surrender, in The Rome Statute Of the International Criminal Court: a 
Commentary (Antonio Cassese, Paolo Gaeta, John R W D Jones eds., 2002), p.1680 
77 See Darryl Robinson, The Rome Statute and its impact on national laws, in The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: a Commentary (Antonio Cassese, Paolo Gaeta, John R W D Jones eds., 2002), 
p.1849-1852 
78 Goran Sluiter, The Surrender of War Criminals to the International Criminal Court, in The International 
Criminal Court (Olympia  Bekou, Robert Cryer ed., 2004), 283 
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b) ‘extradition’ means the delivering up of a person by one State to another 
as provided by treaty, convention or national legislation’. 
Both notions refer to a state’s delivery of a person to another criminal jurisdiction, 
but the distinction between them is that surrender refers to the ICC and extradition refers to 
the prosecution or the enforcement of an individual’s sentence in another state. 
 Although the purposes of surrender and extradition are the same (to prosecute or to 
enforce the sentence)79, the distinction between them is not merely the difference in terms. 
During the negotiations of the Rome Statute it was noted that ‘states did not consent to 
extradite nationals in general but accepted such an obligation only in very specific context 
of the Court…Such a clear distinction at the terminological level should, as was the 
underlying thinking, at the same time contribute to a growing awareness on the national 
level for the substantial differences between horizontal and vertical cooperation’.80 Some 
scholars use ‘horizontal and vertical approach’ stating that the distinction between 
extradition and surrender refers to different relationship between a state and the 
International Criminal Court, and that between two states. The argument that the 
cooperation regime between states is horizontal and the cooperation model between the 
ICC and states is vertical is questionable. Following the approach of verticality, the ICC 
may be described as a supranational court. However, according to the Rome Statute the 
nature of the Court is complementary to national criminal jurisdictions, not supranational. 
Unlike the ad hoc tribunals ICTR and ICTY, which could request a national court at any 
stage of its procedure to defer a case to the international level, and national court would be 
bound to comply with such a request, the ICC may exercise jurisdiction only in case when 
state fails, unwilling or unable to prosecute genuinely.  
Thus the cooperation regime between the International Criminal Court and states is 
horizontal too, it is not vertical. And many arguments support this view. For instance, 
according to article 90 of the Rome Statute if state receives a request from the ICC for 
surrender of person and it also receives request from state not party to the Statute for 
extradition of the same person and this state party is under the obligation to extradite the 
person to this state, then the requested state shall determine whether to surrender the 
person to the Court or to extradite to the requesting state. Consequently the request from 
the Court does not prevail.81     
                                                 
79 Sluiter, supra note 77, p.283 
80 Claus Kress, Article 102: Use of Terms, in Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (Otto Triffterer ed., 1999), pp.1157-58 
81 For more arguments supporting inter-state cooperation model between states and the ICC see Antonio 
Cassese, The Statute of the International Criminal Court: Some Preliminary Reflections, in The International 
Criminal Court (Olympia  Bekou, Robert Cryer ed., 2004), pp.61-63 
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The main distinction between surrender and extradition is in the scope of the 
obligation to surrender to the Court. Two important points should be mentioned here 
concerning extradition: state does not have any obligation to extradite an alleged criminal 
to a foreign state and extradition may be refused for instance on the grounds of principle of 
double criminality82 or in case of political offence. At the same time surrender of persons 
to the ICC is a ‘rigid obligation’83 and no traditional grounds for refusal are applicable in 
case of request for surrender of persons to the Court.  
 
 
3.2    Ukraine’s response to issue of surrender 
 
 
Article 25 of the Constitution of Ukraine provides that citizens of Ukraine shall not 
be expelled from Ukraine or extradited to another state. 
Following the request for an examination of the Rome Statute’s constitutionality 
made by the President of Ukraine, the question whether article 89 (1) of the Statute is 
compatible with article 25 of the Constitution was raised.  
The Constitutional Court examined ‘international legal documents and special 
literature’ and noted that terms ‘extradition’ and ‘surrender’ have different legal nature: the 
former refers to delivery of a person to another state and the latter refers to delivery of a 
person to an international tribunal.84 The Court mentiones that this view is also supported 
in article 102 of the Rome Statute. 
The Constitutional Court concluded that the prohibition against extradition of 
nationals contained in article 25 of the Ukraine’s Constitution ‘concerns only national and 
not international jurisdiction’. The rationale behind such prohibition is to guarantee 
unbiased trial and lawful punishment for citizens and the International Criminal Court 
cannot raise these concerns, it is not a foreign court.85  
                                                                                                                                                    
 
82 This principle stipulates that the offence for which extradition is requested is criminal in both the 
demanding and the requested states.  
83 Claus Kress and Kimberly Prost, Article 89: Surrender of Persons to the Court, in Commentary on the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: observer’s notes, article by article (Otto Triffterer ed., 
1999), p.1072 
84 See Decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine on the conformity of the Rome Statute with the 
Constitution of Ukraine, supra note 9, paragraph 2.3.1 
85 See Decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine on the conformity of the Rome Statute with the 
Constitution of Ukraine, supra note 9, paragraph 2.3.2 
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The final observation made by the Court concerns the complementarity principle. If 
Ukraine investigates and prosecutes Statute crimes committed by its citizens, the issue of 
their surrender to the ICC will not arise.  
Based on these grounds it was concluded that there is no inconsistency between the 
ban on extradition of Ukrainian nationals and article 89 (1) of the Rome Statute. 
The obligation to surrender nationals to the ICC is one of the most common 
constitutional issues that arise during the ratification of the Rome Statute. While some 
states decide to amend constitution in order to clarify the issue86, Ukraine found it possible 
to read constitutional provisions harmoniously with the Statute by way of interpretation. 
The Constitutional Court of Ukraine chose to adopt interpretation proposed in the Statute, 
in article 102. Provisions of this article allowed many states to interpret surrender to the 
ICC as one that does not fall within the scope of prohibition against extradition and to 
avoid amendment.87  
Explaining the difference between surrender to the ICC and extradition to other 
states, the Constitutional Court mentioned that ban on extradition ‘aims to guarantee 
unbiased judicial review and justice, and lawfulness of punishment for its citizens and the 
ICC cannot be equated to a foreign court’. This view is supported by many commentators. 
For instance, Darryl Robinson, suggesting arguments that could be used by states that 
decide to interpret constitutional provisions mentions that ‘prohibitions on extradition were 
generally adopted to protect nationals from the uncertainties of foreign prosecution…The 
procedures of the ICC comply with international standards and numerous safeguards 
ensure that it will not engage in frivolous prosecutions’.88  
In support of its statement that the ICC cannot be equated to a court of another 
country, the Constitutional Court of Ukraine notes that ‘the aim explaining the prohibition 
to extradite citizens of one state to another is reached in the ICC by applying 
corresponding provisions of the Statute, developed or agreed upon by the participating 
states. These provisions are based on international pacts on human rights whereas Ukraine 
has already agreed to be bound by it’.  
Position of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine on this issue is disputable. On the one 
hand, the Court stated correctly that provisions of the Rome Statute are based on human 
rights treaties. Procedural rights of suspects and persons accused before the ICC are 
defined in articles 55 and 67 of the Rome Statute. Particularly, article 67 is modelled on 
                                                 
86 For instance, Germany, Czech Republic, Slovenia 
87 For example, Italia, Norway, Honduras, Guatemala 
88 Robinson, The Rome Statute and its impact on national laws, supra note 76, at 1854, see also Schabas, 
supra note 22, at 134; Duffy, supra note 8, at 23 
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article 14 (3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.89 As William A. 
Schabas states, rights stipulated in article 55 of the Statute go even well beyond the 
requirements of international human rights norms, set out in such instruments as the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.90  
On the other hand, constitutional prohibitions on extradition are generally adopted to 
protect nationals from the uncertainty of being judged in a foreign court. The 
Constitutional Court is of the opinion that the prohibition of surrender concerns only 
‘foreign court’, in other words courts of other states. And the ICC is an international court, 
not foreign domestic court. These provisions may also be interpreted as protecting 
nationals from the uncertainty of being judged in a system that is foreign to them. In this 
case is the ICC may be considered as a foreign system, because it is not Ukrainian. The 
prosecution by the ICC may be described as a foreign prosecution and the main question 
here is whether correspondence of the Rome Statute with human rights treaties makes this 
prosecution certain.  
Helen Duffy mentions that in case if the International Criminal Court would violate 
the human rights of suspects or accused persons, such an act would violate its own Statute 
and would be a matter within the jurisdiction of the Assembly of States Parties.91 Is this a 
guarantee that rights of accused would be protected?  
The protection of the right of the accused to a fair trial was the first obstacle the ICC 
met before the start of its first trial. In trial of Thomas Lubanga the judges of the Trial 
Chamber unanimously decided to “stay” the proceedings against Lubanga, because the 
prosecution has been unable to disclose documents containing exculpatory information 
gathered during investigation that had been provided confidentially by the United Nations 
and other organizations. The Rome Statute allows collection of confidential information, 
but “solely for the purpose of generating new evidence”.92 Judges of the Chamber 
concluded that “the right to a fair trial - which is without doubt a fundamental right - 
includes an entitlement to disclosure of exculpatory material”.93   
The failure of the Office of the Prosecutor to disclose potentially exculpatory 
documents bears on the ability to provide a complete defense and Lubanga could not have 
a fair trial. As judges held ‘the trial process has been ruptured to such a degree that it is 
                                                 
89 Schabas, supra note 22, at 98 
90 Id., at 131 
91 Duffy, supra note 8, at 24 
92 The Rome Statute art.54(3)(e) 
93 The ICC, Trial Chamber I, case of the Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the consequences 
of non-disclosure of exculpatory materials covered by article 54(3)(e) agreements and the application to stay 
the prosecution of the accused, together with certain other issues raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 
2008, ICC-01/04-01-06/1401 available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/cases/RDC/c0106/c0106_docTrial1.html  
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now impossible to piece together the constituent elements of a fair trial’.94 The judges 
managed to correct OTP’s deficiencies but this situation is worrying and questions the 
‘certainty’ of prosecution by the ICC. 
Article 25 of the Constitution of Ukraine not only prohibits extradition of Ukrainian 
nationals to another state, but also prohibits their expulsion from Ukraine. Prohibition 
against expulsion can be interpreted as including prohibition against surrender of 
Ukrainian nationals to international tribunals. Such prohibition exists in other countries too 
and though it seems this could create difficulties in ratification of the Statute, Ukraine as 
well as Sweden, Costa Rica and Venezuela managed to interpret these provisions in favour 
of the ICC Statute.  
Dealing with this issue, the Ukrainian Court noted that ‘provisions related to 
prohibition on extradition (even in case of wide interpretation of the term ‘extradition’) 
should not be considered separately from international legal obligations of Ukraine’.95 The 
Court did not specify any international treaty but for instance the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide and Convention against Apartheid 
Ukraine is part of provide for possibility of transfer of nationals to the international penal 
tribunal.96 Ukraine has recognized the duty to prosecute or extradite for many of the crimes 
under the ICC Statute by ratification of the Geneva Conventions, Convention Against 
Torture and Genocide Convention. Following the line of argumentation of the 
Constitutional Court if the prohibition of expulsion did not prevent Ukraine from 
concluding these international treaties, then in case with the Rome Statute it should not be 
an obstacle.  
Discussing the issues of conformity of the Rome Statute with the Constitution the 
Court should be guided by the principle of supremacy of the Constitution of Ukraine over 
international treaties. The Court used international legal obligations of Ukraine as an 
argument. Such obligations arise from international treaties ratified by Ukraine and that’s 
why reference to these obligations is possible only in cases when the Constitutional Court 
gives its opinion on the constitutionality of these treaties.  
Interesting interpretation of prohibition of expulsion was used by Costa Rica. The 
Supreme Court of Costa Rica held that such prohibition was not absolute and should be 
read in spirit of development of international human rights law. Constitution should be 
                                                 
94 Id. at 93 
95 Decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine on the conformity of the Rome Statute with the 
Constitution of Ukraine, supra note 9, paragraph 2.3.3 
96 See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, UN GA/Res/260 (III), art. 6; 
International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid, GA/Res/3068 
(XXVI), art. 5 
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seen as an instrument for promotion of new developments. Thus, the Supreme Court 
concluded that the new international order established by the Rome Statute to protect 
human rights was compatible with the constitution.97  
Similar argument could be used by the Ukraine’s Constitutional Court. The 
Ukrainian Constitution was adopted in 1996, before the adoption of the Rome Statute. That 
is why possibility of surrender of Ukrainian citizens to the ICC is not envisaged in the 
Constitution. But constitutional provisions should always be interpreted in accordance with 
their object, and it is unlikely that the purpose of the prohibition on expulsion of Ukrainian 
nationals is to exempt perpetrators of international crimes from punishment. 
Ukraine as it was correctly mentioned by the Constitutional Court may avoid any 
constitutional difficulties with surrendering of nationals to the ICC by prosecuting a 
national who committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC in accordance with the 
principle of complementarity. But in order to prosecute its nationals Ukraine must ensure 
the implementation of the Rome Statute in its domestic law and criminalize the conduct 
that falls under the jurisdiction of the ICC. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
97 See Issues Raised with Regard to the Rome Statute by National Constitutional Courts, supra note 27, at 9 
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4.   Enforcement of the sentences in third states 
 
4.1  The enforcement regime under the Rome Statute 
 
 
Article 103 of the Rome Statute defines the role of states in enforcing prison 
sentences. Since the ICC does not have capacity to enforce the sentences as there is no ICC 
prison it is dependant on state parties for this enforcement. Aforementioned article 
stipulates that sentences shall be served in a state designated by the Court from a list of 
States which have indicated their willingness to accept sentenced persons.  
The enforcement regime of the ICC is in some respects similar to regime established 
for the ad hoc tribunals.98 Pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of article 103, the designation of 
states by the Court is based on ‘principle that States Parties should share the responsibility 
for enforcing sentences of imprisonment, in accordance with the principles of equitable 
distribution’. Another important feature of this regime is that it is based on system of 
double consent. First, the state of enforcement must have consented to its being placed on a 
list of candidate states pursuant to article 103(1) and (2), and then the state of enforcement 
has to accept its designation according to article 103(3).99 If no state is designated, the 
sentence of imprisonment shall be served in the host state – the Netherlands.100  
In process of designation the ICC shall take into consideration the principle of 
equitable distribution, application of widely accepted international treaty standards 
governing the treatment of prisoners, the views and nationality of sentenced person and 
other factors regarding the circumstances of the crime or the person sentenced.101 
The conditions of imprisonment will be governed by the national law of the State of 
enforcement and shall be consistent with widely accepted international treaty standards 
governing treatment of prisoners. At the same time these conditions neither more nor less 
favorable than the conditions of prisoners convicted of similar offences.102  
After the ICC has designated a state, according to article 106, it will have a power to 
supervise the enforcement and, pursuant to article 104(1), the Court may at any time 
transfer a sentenced person to a prison of another state.  
 
                                                 
98 See Claus Kress and Goran Sluiter, Imprisonment, in The Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court: a Commentary (Antonio Cassese, Paolo Gaeta, John R W D Jones eds., 2002), p.1758 
99 Id at 1787 
100 The Rome Statute art. 103(4) 
101 The Rome Statute art. 103(3) 
102 The Rome Statute art. 106(2) 
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4.2   Compatibility of article 103 of the Rome Statute with Ukraine’s Constitution 
 
 
According to article 103 after sentencing an offender the Court will designate a state 
where the punishment will take place and that means that Ukrainian nationals may serve 
term in any state determined by the Court.  
In the request of the President of Ukraine to the Constitutional Court of Ukraine the 
issue whether provisions of article 103 of the Rome Statute contradict to article 63 (3) and 
article 64 (1) of the Constitution of Ukraine was raised. 
Pursuant to article 63 (3) of the Constitution ‘a convicted person enjoys all human 
and citizens' rights except for the restrictions determined by law and established by the 
court decision’. And provisions of article 64 (1) stipulate that ‘human and citizens' rights 
and freedomsguaranteed by the Constitution shall not be restricted except in cases 
envisaged by the Constitution of Ukraine’. According to the position of the President 
provisions of article 103 of the Statute will subject Ukrainian nationals to the action of 
laws of other state while serving sentence, which deprives them of rights, guaranteed by 
the Constitution of Ukraine.  
Considering this issue the Constitutional Court held that possible limitation of rights 
and freedoms of Ukraine’s citizens in case of their serving punishment in other state could 
be diminished by means of declaration made by Ukraine stating willingness to accept its 
citizens serve their sentences in Ukraine.103 The Court also noted that it is important to take 
into account that the ICC designating the state of enforcement considers, inter alia, the 
view and nationality of the sentenced person and application of widely accepted 
international treaty standards governing the treatment of prisoners.104 On these grounds the 
Constitutional Court concluded that paragraph 1 part (a) of article 103 of the Rome Statute 
does not contradict articles 63 (3) and 64 (1) of Ukraine’s Constitution. 
The Constitutional Court asserts that in case of declaration the possible limitation of 
rights and freedoms of Ukrainians in case of serving punishment will be reduced. The 
Rome Statute indeed permits a state to provide declarations and attach certain conditions to 
its acceptance of enforcing prison sentences. However, the ICC Statute does not envisage 
that declaration of willingness to accept own nationals will be a deciding factor in the 
designating process. Bert Swart states that ‘by making a declaration pursuant to Article 103 
                                                 
103 See Decision of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine on the conformity of the Rome Statute with the 
Constitution of Ukraine, supra note 9, paragraph 2.7.1 
104 See Id., paragraph 2.7.2 
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of the Statute, the State of nationality may influence the likelihood that its national will be 
able to serve a sentence on its territory’.105 The ICC will only take the declaration into 
consideration, but it cannot secure Ukrainian citizens to serve punishment in Ukraine and 
from possible limitation of their rights.  
Such states as Switzerland, Liechtenstein and Andorra have already provided this 
kinds of declarations. For instance, Switzerland declared that ‘In accordance with article 
103, paragraph 1, of the Statute, Switzerland declares that it is prepared to be responsible 
for enforcement of sentences of imprisonment handed down by the Court against Swiss 
nationals or persons habitually resident in Switzerland’.106 Ukraine may provide similar 
declaration but as it was mentioned above it will only increase the likelihood that the ICC 
will designate Ukraine as state where Ukrainians will serve sentence of imprisonment. 
As for the second argument of the Constitutional Court article 103 (3) of the Statute 
indeed stipulates criteria that must be taken into consideration by the ICC before the 
designation of the state but these criteria are of different importance. Speaking about the 
nationality of the convicted person it does not necessarily point to the preference for 
Ukrainian national to serve sentence in Ukraine. ‘Whereas the goal of social rehabilitation 
usually makes it preferable to imprison a person in his or her national State, the 
peculiarities of international crimes may suggest precisely the contrary’.107 The ICC shall 
also take into account the views of the convicted person, however, as a result of close 
examination of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, some commentators came to 
conclusion that ‘the transfer of the sentenced person to the state of enforcement does not 
take place in the interest of the sentenced person but to ensure the enforcement of the 
sentence’.108  
Another factor that will be taken into account by the ICC in the process of 
designation of state is the application of widely accepted international treaty standards 
governing the treatment of prisoners. This means that if there is any doubt as to the 
adherence of a State to such standards, this will unavoidably preclude this state from 
enforcement.109  
Standards at issue are, first of all, those envisaged in general human rights treaties 
like the ICCPR and ECHR110 as well as those found in specialized instruments of a 
                                                 
105 Swart, Arrest and Surrender, supra note 76, at 1684 
106 Schabas, supra note 22, at 421 (appendix 5: declarations and reservations) 
107 Kress and Sluiter, Imprisonment, supra note 98, at 1789 
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109 See Id, at 1788 
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of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Council of Europe, ETS no.005 
 35
recommendatory nature.111 It should be also taken into account that the enforcement of the 
sentence will be subject to supervision by the ICC.112 The ICC may always react on ill-
treatment of prisoner by changing the state of enforcement (such power is given to the ICC 
by article 104(1) of the Rome Statute). The ICC will always have means to control the 
enforcement. 
This sounds promising on paper, however, the International Criminal Court has not 
sentenced any person yet and it is impossible to know how this mechanism will work in 
practice. The Constitutional Court of Ukraine seems to place too much trust in the ICC 
recognizing the process of designation of state of imprisonment as one that guarantees non-
limitation of rights and freedoms of Ukrainian nationals. The Court has not yet 
demonstrated its credibility or shown that it is an effective institution. 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
111 For more details see Kress and Sluiter, Imprisonment, supra note 98, at 1768 
112 The Rome Statute art. 106 
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5. Conclusion 
 
 
 Ukraine is among the states that are in the process of ratification of the Rome Statute 
and during this process it has faced different challenges common to many other countries.  
The Constitutional Court of Ukraine considering the issue of the conformity of the 
Rome Statute with the Constitution has reached a conclusion that the Rome Statute does 
not correspond to the Constitution of Ukraine in the part concerning the provisions of 
paragraph ten of the Preamble and article 1 of the Statute where it says that ‘an 
International Criminal Court…shall be complementary to national criminal jurisdiction’, 
and that adherence of Ukraine to the Statute is possible only after introduction of relevant 
changes to it. 
The Constitutional Court of Ukraine holds that the possibility of such a supplement 
of judicial system of Ukraine is not envisaged by the Constitution. Strangely enough, 
discussing the issue the Court did not discuss the nature of the complementarity of the ICC 
in its decision. Indeed the Constitution does not foresee the possibility of supplementing 
the national judicial system as it was adopted before the International Criminal Court was 
established. And speaking about the principle of complementarity the ICC can not become 
a part of the national judicial system. The article 17 of the Statute provides for guarantees 
that preserve national interests and judicial integrity at the national level and the ICC will 
not be able to step in unless the state in question is unable or unwilling to exercise its 
jurisdiction.  
Article 55 of the Constitution stipulates that ‘…everyone has the right to appeal for 
the protection of his or her rights and freedoms to the relevant international judicial 
institutions’. The Constitutional Court observed that Ukrainian nationals have the right to 
appeal to the European Court of Human Rights on the basis of this article, but the nature of 
the ICC is significantly different from that of the ECHR. This argument of the Court is 
criticized by Ukrainian lawyers who state that it lacks common sense to recognize the 
ECHR and not the ICC. Both institutions are ‘supplementary remedies by their nature for 
protection of human and citizen’s rights and freedoms’. However, I agree with the position 
of the Constitutional Court that difference between these courts is obvious. The ECHR 
receives applications from the victims of human rights violations committed by states 
parties to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
Whereas the ICC exercises jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of 
international concern. 
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The second matter that was considered by the Constitutional Court of Ukraine was 
constitutional immunities granted to the head of state and People’s Deputies. However, 
under article 27 of the Rome Statute a state cannot refuse to surrender its nationals on the 
basis of their having immunity. The position of the Constitutional Court is that article 27 of 
the Statute is in conformity with constitutional provisions. Ukraine has already taken 
international obligations to bar granting immunity from persecution for the most serious 
crimes following from the conclusion of international treaties such as Convention Against 
Torture or the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 
The Court has also held that immunity of People’s Deputies and the President of Ukraine 
concerns only national jurisdiction and may not be an obstacle to exercise jurisdiction by 
the ICC. Immunity is not their personal privilege and cannot be considered as a guarantee 
of their impunity.  
The view taken by the Constitutional Court on issue of immunities seems to be 
reasonable. International practice shows that this interpretation is not new. However, one 
argument raises doubts. The Court mentioned that ‘the establishment of responsibility for 
committing majority of crimes stipulated by the Statute is an international legal obligation 
of Ukraine according to other international treaties ratified by Ukraine’. According to 
article 8 the Constitution of Ukraine is the supreme law in the country and takes over the 
international treaties. Therefore application of arguments proving the constitutionality of 
the Rome Statute with reference to treaties ratified by Ukraine is possible only if the 
Constitutional Court of Ukraine makes decision on the issue of conformity of these treaties 
with the Constitution. 
Another issue that was raised before the Court was surrendering of Ukrainian 
nationals to the International Criminal Court. According to the Constitution of Ukraine 
citizens of Ukraine shall not be expelled from Ukraine or extradited to another state. The 
Constitutional Court based the interpretation of constitutional provisions on distinction 
between the terms of ‘surrender’ and ’extradition’. Another argument concerned the 
rationale behind the prohibition of extradition. The Court held that prohibition was adopted 
to protect citizens to guarantee impartial judicial review (and this includes protection from 
uncertainties of prosecution) in the foreign court and the ICC is not a foreign court, it was 
being established by agreement of states on the basis of international law. In the view of 
the Court the ICC Statute meets the aim that explaines the prohibition of extradition. 
Interestingly in the Lubanga case, the first case considered by the ICC, the prosecution did 
not share the documents that may contain information supporting Mr. Lubanga's innocence 
with the defence. This fact constitutes violation of the right of the accused person to a fair 
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trial. Though the judges stopped the violation and stayed the proceeding this situation 
raises concern about how ‘certain’ the prosecution by the ICC may be.  
The prohibition of expulsion of Ukrainians was interpreted by the Constitutional 
Court in the light of international obligations of Ukraine, what in my opinion as it was 
stated above is not correct from the point of view of the supremacy of the Constitution. 
The Court could interpret constitutional provisions stating that it was unlikely that the 
purpose of the prohibition on expulsion is to exempt perpetrators of international crimes 
from punishment.  
The Court has also considered situation when the human rights and freedoms of 
Ukrainian citizens may be restricted when serving sentences in another country. Following 
its position Ukraine can safeguard constitutional guarantees for its own citizens by 
expressing its willingness to accept sentenced Ukrainian citizens by the ICC. The Court 
has also observed that according to article 103 of the Statute the ICC when determining the 
state where a sentenced person should serve the punishment considers, inter alia, 
nationality and views of this person, as well as application of widely accepted international 
treaty standards governing the treatment of prisoners. In the view of the Court these 
guarantees are sufficient enough to conclude that the rights and freedoms of Ukrainians 
will not be limited. In my view both arguments of the Constitutional Court are 
questionable. First of all the declaration will not guarantee that Ukrainian nationals will 
serve sentence of imprisonment in Ukraine. It will only increase such a likelihood. 
Therefore, this argument is irrelevant in this discussion. Secondly, procedure of the 
designation of a state by the ICC envisaged in article 103 sounds promising on paper. But 
we do not know how it will work in practice. The statement that this procedure guarantees 
that rights and freedoms of Ukrainian nationals will not be restricted in case of their 
serving punishment in other state means placing too much trust in the ICC.   
There are certain provisions of the Statute that were not discussed by the 
Constitutional Court, but which might be in conflict with Ukraine’s Constitution. For 
instance, the issue of pardon and amnesty. According to the Constitution the President of 
Ukraine is empowered to grant pardon and the Verkhovna Rada may declare amnesty by 
adopting a relevant law of Ukraine. The Rome Statute restricts power of the President to 
grant pardon and deprives the Parliament of its ability to declare amnesty.  
Now when the Constitutional Court of Ukraine rulled that the Rome Statute did not 
correspond to the Constitution when it comes to the complementarity of the ICC, the 
ratification of this document may happen only after the constitutional amendment.  
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In case when international treaty is in conflict with the Constitution, Ukraine usually 
has four solutions to this problem: 1) to amend the Constitution, 2) to change provisions of 
the treaty that do not comply with the Constitution, 3) to make a reservation to the treaty or 
4) to refuse to ratify it.  
In case with the Rome Statute the second and the third options are not possible. As 
for the forth option as it was mentioned earlier in the first chapter of the thesis Ukraine 
signs treaties with the intention of ratifying it. Denying ratification does not correspond to 
Ukraine’s international legal practice. The fact that Ukraine acceded to the Agreement on 
Privileges and Immunities of the ICC on 29 January 2007 can be understood as its 
intention to ratify the Rome Statute, whether sooner or later. 
By changing the Constitution Ukraine has two alternatives: 1) to amend the 
Constitution introducing a general provision stipulating that Ukraine may recognize the 
jurisdiction of international judicial bodies on the basis of international treaties ratified by 
the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine; 2) to add provision providing that the International 
Criminal Court complements courts of general jurisdiction of Ukraine and its functioning 
is governed by the provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
Both alternatives have their advantages and will solve the problem of non-conformity.  
The constitutional amendment procedure is a complicated process in Ukraine and 
may take many years. However, there is one more option that can be used. According to 
the law on the Constitutional Court of Ukraine (article 68) the Court may reconsider the 
case provided that the new circumstances of the case that existed at the moment the Court 
considered the case became evident. The Court may reconsider the case and try to interpret 
constitutional provisions so it is in conformity with the Rome Statute. In this case the 
ratification of the Rome Statute becomes easier than in case of constitutional amendment.  
Eight years have passed since Ukraine signed the Rome Statute. Movement of 
Ukraine towards ratification is very slow. At this moment the constitutional amendments 
that were drafted by the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning the 
Rome Statute were submitted to the Constitutional Court of Ukraine which in its turn will 
makes final decision whether these amendments restrict the rights and freedoms of 
Ukrainian nationals or not. The draft will then be submitted to the Verkhovna Rada for 
approval. And it is impossible to predict how much time it will take for the Parliament to 
approve the constitutional amendments.  
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